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ABSTRACT: The Karamat Watan (March of Dignity) was the largest protest mobilisation in Kuwaiti 
history. From late December 2011 to 2014 this social movement pressured the government in the streets 
to reform the parliamentary system. The results of these protests were unprecedented, forcing a Kuwaiti 
prime minister to resign for the first time in in history and publicly challenging against the country’s ruler. 
Yet the protest movement largely failed, largely due to a loss of public support. Why did the Karamat 
Watan protest movement lose support from the public in Kuwait? The literature on the Gulf and Kuwait in 
particular focus on payoffs as a way of explaining acquiesance, yet payoffs in 2011 and 2012 had almost 
no impact on protest mobilisation. Instead, it may be more normative issues that kept protesters away: 
the unrealistic and aggressive demands of protest organisers for regime change. This article focuses on 
the legitimacy, or lackthereof, of the government and regime to explain the failure of the “Arab Spring” 
protest movement in Kuwait, looking at how consent and normative concerns impacted the decision of 
protesters to leave the streets. Data was collected through semi-structured interviews with citizens who 
participated in the protests, interviews with dozens of members of the opposition leadership, and group 
surveys at 13 tribal diwaniyas that highlight a cross-section of protesters’ opinion. The research 
presented demonstrates that public support for the social movement may have in part failed largely 
because the movement was unsuccessful in framing that it could govern if it was successful. Public 
support was also limited by protest tactics including disrupting modes of transportation and livelihood. At 
the heart of protesters’ concerns was the lack of a substantive opposition they could believe in and poor 
opinions on the quality of leadership in Karamat Watan. This article fills a gap in the literature by 
developing a clearer understanding of legitimation in a rentier state, Kuwait, and by providing dense 
empirical data to back it up. The utility of this approach is important considering that the failure for many 
social movements to frame grievances in a way that mobilizes the population, a common pattern in the 
region.  
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The Karamat Watan (March of Dignity) was the largest protest mobilisation in Kuwaiti history. From 
late 2012 to 2014, this social movement pressured the government to reform the parliamentary system and 
root out corruption. The protests, at the height of the Arab Spring, were unprecedented not only because 
of their scale, but also because of the direct challenges publicly directed at the Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh 
Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, and the call for full parliamentary democracy. While a landmark, the protest 
movement can equally be considered a case study for its failure. By the middle of 2014, activists could 
not martial more than a few hundred protesters to their cause. As observers have noted, they lost public 
support and there has been a rapid increase of inclusive reformist sentiment since (Tavana, et al. 2018). 
Why did the Karamat Watan (KW) protest movement lose support from the Kuwaiti public? 
The most often cited literatures focus on state responses, rentierism, state sanctioned repression or 
divide and rule identity politics to provide an answer (Yom and Gause 2012; Bank et al. 2014). Yet 
looked at from a historical perspective, increases in rent are actually part of a longer trend; hard 
repression only followed movement failure, and the movement was overwhelmingly homogenous, 
comprised of Sunni Islamists and tribespeople. These explanations are also only correlations rather than 
causations. Perhaps there is a simpler answer to the loss of public support, often not discussed by scholars 
because of rigid and normative conceptions of democracy. The answer may be that the vast majority of 
Kuwaiti nationals see their government and the ruling family as legitimate, more so than the protest 
movement which frames collective action poorly. There is a gap in the literature concerning Social 
Movement Theory (SMT), state legitimation efforts and framing (Abulof 2017). In the Gulf, the most 
common observations are of the legitimacy of the monarchy as an institution, problem-solver, and 
distributor of rents (Lucas 2014). Yet most often, research focuses purely on acquiesance, instead of 
consent (Mitchell and Gengler 2019). 
To fill this gap, this article investigates the failure of the KW movement in Kuwait by looking at public 
support for the movement’s collective action frames. It focuses on several critical subjects, which may 
explain the movement’s failure: payoffs, different modes of repression, various public opinions about the 
movement and the opposition, identity conflicts within the movement, and the legitimacy of the regime. 
The data to answer these questions derive from 35 semi-structured interviews with citizens who 
participated in the protests, and focus group surveys at 13 diwaniyas1 that highlight a cross-section of 
public opinion from 195 individuals from tribal and Islamist backgrounds actively involved in the 
protests. Using diwaniyas as data points for public opinion, especially within the tribal and Islamist 
communities is a useful methodogical tool and adds nuance to important normative issues, especially as 
diwaniyas are often considered an exclusively Kuwaiti urban (hadhari) forum. Various scholars note that 
these forums are not reducible to one narrative or domesticity and “serve to coalesce, filter, and transmit 
Kuwaiti opinion on public issues” (Tetreault 2000; Chay 2015; Russell 1989). The fieldwork interviews 
and focus groups were conducted from December 2019 to September 2020. The author was also present 
as an observer at several of the Irhal protests – a precedent of KW – in 2012 and KW protests in 2013 and 
2014.  
The findings demonstrate that public support for the social movement failed largely because: a) it was 
seen to disrespect the Emir of Kuwait, in a way that questioned to the established political system with the 
 
1 The diwaniya is a part of the house that Kuwaiti men use to receive male guests. 





Al-Sabah regime at its head, which was preferable to the calls for regime change by the KW organisers, 
b) the movement failed to prove that it could govern if it was successful in getting the government to 
reform the legislative system, c) it disrupted modes of transportation and livelihood from protests, 
therefore undermining bases of support, and d) it did not acknowledge many of the positive aspects of 
Kuwaiti government rule, including public trust concerning material benefits. This article fills a gap in the 
literature by developing a clearer understanding of legitimation frames in a rentier state. The utility of this 
approach is important considering that the failure for many social movements to sustain public support, 
and governments’ ability to maintain their rule, was about more than payoffs or repression; often thought 
to be the main coercive tools of authoritarian regimes.The study of SMT and normativity in politics, often 
left to the wayside by state-centric studies, needs to be an increasingly important focus for the study of 
politics and protest, as it undermines many of the structuralist theories that have overwhelmed the Gulf 
states. 
 
2. Setting the Stage for Karamat Watan 
 
The KW protests converged with previous grievances and seminal events to generate the largest 
protests in Kuwait’s history. Three flashpoints brought about the emergence of a social movement, 
primarily members of the specific tribal backgrounds (Mutran, Mutair, Azmi, Ajmi, or Shammari) and 
supportive of Islamist, Salafist, and the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islamic Constitutional Movement 
(Azouley 2020).  In the leadup to KW, the main vehicle of protests was Irhal Nastahiqq al-Afdal 
(literally, “Leave, we deserve the best”), which emerged in 2009 in response to corruption allegations 
against Prime Minister Nasir Al-Muhammad Al-Sabah. 2 Nasir had been repeatedly accused of financial 
mismanagement and bribing legislators, yet had not been held criminally accountable by the parliament. 
The Irhal movement had a clear goal that became a clear objective of the KW protest: it wanted Nasir to 
resign as prime minister.  
The second occurred on 8 December 2010, just before Arab Spring protests began in Tunisia and 
Egypt. Police interrupted a political seminar at the home of an opposition parliamentarian, Jumaan Al-
Harbash. This resulted in an altercation known as “Black Wednesday,” in which MPs, journalists from Al 
Jazeera, and well-known law professor Obaid Al-Wasmi were attacked by police on camera. The news 
shocked and angered many Kuwaitis, as it violated a long-standing norm in Kuwaiti politics, supported by 
a constitutional provision, of people hosting political events at their diwaniyas without state interference. 
Against this background, a vegetable vendor in Tunisia turned these two sparks into a flame, re-
energising the opposition with new tactics and inspiration. Spurred on by these conditions, youth activists 
formed the core of a growing movement, including Irhal, “Al-Sur al-Khamis” (Fifth wall), “Kafī” 
(Enough), and “Nahj” (Way). In the first major sit-in on 8 March 2011 – organised by Kafi – at the 
Parliament, approximately 1,000 protesters demanded the departure of Nasir.   
With Nasir’s support in Parliament already precarious, a major controversy emerged in the summer of 
2011. A Kuwaiti newspaper, Al-Qabas, revealed that a dozen members of the National Assembly had 
received suspicious bank deposits of approximately $350 million from the prime minister’s office. On 
November 15, the government dodged a parliamentary investigation on the scandal. The next day, 
thousands of protesters demanded the dismissal of the Prime Minister, culminating in the storming of 
 
2 See Irhal Nastahiqq al-Afdal, “Our role… What is your role?” November 9, 2009, 
https://ourroleq8.blogspot.com/2009/11/blog-post.html.  




Parliament by several hundred activists and a dozen MPs. In the shadow of a larger protest on 27 
November, Nasir submitted his resignation. 
The parliamentary opposition, now aligned with the protesters, cemented its gains when it won a 
majority of seats in the February 2012 elections. The election resulted in a 54% turnover, as opposition 
MPs won thirty-five of the fifty elected seats and had the majority for the first time since 1963, leading to 
the formation of the Majority Bloc (Al-Aghlabiyya). Relations between the cabinet and the opposition 
deteriorated quickly, with MPs demanding half of all cabinet seats, forcing two cabinet members to resign 
and sharply criticising the independence of the courts and calling for parliamentary vetting of judicial 
appointees.3 By 14 June, the intensity of the Majority Bloc’s criticism prompted the Emir to suspend the 
National Assembly for one month. Two days later, the Constitutional Court declared the elections of 
February 2012 null and void, leading to new elections scheduled for 1 December. The failure of the 
opposition in parliament to gain more popular control of government institutions outraged members of the 
youth movements and set the stage for KW.   
 
3. Enter and Exit: Karamat Watan 
 
In anticipation of another opposition-dominated parliament, the Emir issued a decree amending the 
electoral law in October 2012, controversially switching to a single non-transferable vote instead of the 
four-vote system (Coates Ulrichsen 2014). The new one-vote system impacted candidates as well as 
citizens’ approach to elections as it limited the ability of groups “to form electoral coalitions and mobilize 
voters” (Tavana et al. 2018). Against this backdrop was a transformative shift in the structure of social 
movements in Kuwait. Irhal, Nahj, and Kafi merged into the new Civil Democratic Movement (CDM) in 
March 2012. CDM became the masthead of a movement that included many Islamist and tribal youths, 
bridging a wide swathe of Kuwaiti society due to the fact that it was youth led and cross-ideological.  
The largest protests in Kuwaiti history were named “Karamat Watan” (KW) after a blog that emerged 
on 11 October 2012, in response to rumors about the change to the electoral system. The blog announced 
that it would organise a rally in protest of the decree, with a similar account launched on Twitter a few 
days later.4 The KW era started with a speech by Musallam Al-Barrak on 15 October at a rally organised 
at Al-Erada. Al-Barrak, from the Mutran tribe, over time had became the uncontested leader of the 
parliamentary opposition, the so-called “Conscience of the Nation”. From 1996 to 2012 he won six 
consecutive terms with the highest number of votes, making him the longest-serving Member of 
Parliament and most popular (Azouley 2020).  
Al-Barrak gave the final speech; unlike the other speakers at the event, Al-Barrak was not cautious. Al-
Barrak shattered the long-established taboo about criticising the Emir, saying “We will not allow you [lan 
nasmah lak], your highness, in the name of the nation and in the name of the people, to practice autocratic 
rule…We are not scared of your new batons or the jails you have built.”5 This phrase, lan nasmah lak, 
became famous and was repeatedly chanted at demonstrations. On 20 October, the Emir issued the decree 
 
3 Executive power is vested in the Emir, who appoints a prime minister and approves his Council of Ministers (cabinet).  
4 To this day, those behind the accounts have not revealed their identities. Please see “Important information for the 
Karamet Watan protest” (blog), October 11, 2012, https://karametwatan.wordpress. ./ -وطن-كرامة-لمسيرة-هامة -تعليمات
2/11 /10/2012 /com 
5 See the famous speech here, “Al-Barrak, ‘Your Highness, we will not allow you’”, YouTube clip, 40:24, posted by 
AlziadiQ8, October 15, 2012, https://youtu.be/n7nnFUOEmBY. 





implementing the new electoral system and called for elections on 1 December, leading to a call for 
demonstrations on the KW Twitter account.6 
The first demonstration was held on 21 October on the panoramic coastal Gulf Road, with an estimated 
45,000 to 100,000 participating. The second KW protest on 4 November was broken up as riot police 
deployed against tens of thousands of protestors. The third protest, held on 16 November, attracted similar 
crowds to the first. Activists and members of the Majority bloc initiated a boycott of the December 
election. On the eve of the 31 December 2012 elections, a march attracted tens of thousands who marched 
in support of an election boycott. The boycott was highly effective, with only 39.6% of registered voters 
turning out for the December elections.7 No one knew at the time, but this was the last major opposition 
protest. 
Three more marches followed in January 2013, but rather than putting pressure on the government, the 
protests petered out. Kuwaiti public opinion had become more fearful of instability by 2014 as Syria, 
Yemen, and Libya fell into sectarian strife and armed violence, sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program 
racheted up the chance of a regional war, and neighbouring Bahraini protesters felt the brunt of a 
concerted crackdown (Albloshi and Herb 2018). Only around 400 protesters participated in the fifth and 
sixth protests. The seventh protest, on 22 January 2013, drew under 1,000. With support waning, fractures 
were beginning to emerge with personal disputes between its leaders. In June 2013, the Constitutional 
Court ruled that the December 2012 elections were invalid, forcing new elections to be held on 27 July. 
Only 27 of the original 35 members of the Majority Bloc met and pledged to continue the boycott. The 
Majority Bloc had a difficult relationship with the youth activists from KW throughout the course of the 
protests. While the Bloc remained vocally antigovernment, they were criticised for not doing enough to 
drum up support of the protests and for interfering in the protests for their own personal interests or self-
promotion.8 Voter turnout rebounded to just over 50%, widely seen as a victory for the government. The 
movement had a last burst of activity in the summer of 2014, with the eighth and final KW protest, on 6 
July 2014, which attracted only hundreds. The final Twitter post was made on the movement account the 
same day (Albloshi and Herb 2018).   
 
4. Karamat Watan in Theoretical Perspective 
 
The KW protests fit with Tarrow’s concept of a social movement, as it led to “sustained challenges to 
powerholders in the name of a disadvantaged population” (McAdam et al. 1996). The KW was a non-
violent political reform movement which aimed for limited, albeit significant changes to a political 
system, full parliamentary democracy, to improve conditions within the existing regime (Snow and Soule 
2010). An important feature of KW was that it was organisationally flexible with decentralised leadership, 
consultative decision-making structures, and use of text messages and social media (Twitter) to organise 
(Martin 2018). The emergence of important youth groups, such as CDM, entirely outside the 
parliamentary process added to the organisational diversity of the KW movement. It also featured a core 
cadre of one hundred members, large by Kuwaiti social movement standards. 
From 2011 to 2012, activists ended the political career of Nasir and dissolved a pro-government 
parliament. But despite the flurry of political activism, the regime’s power remained intact due to one 
intervening variable; a critical lack of sustained public support, central to a social movement’s success 
 
6 See the tweet here posted on October 19, 2012: https://twitter.com/KarametWatan/status/259414257433735169. 
7 “39.6%: The final turnout for the elections”, al-Qabas, December 7, 2012: 7. 
8 Interview in diwaniya in Jahra, Kuwait, January, 2020. 




(Ghabra 2014). KW’s protests initially brought out tens of thousands against the government of Nasir. 
But in contrast to the standing government, the elections in July 2013 illustrated that the monarchical 
regime enjoyed the support of many Kuwaitis and protests receded.9 The difference between public 
attitudes towards the government and the monarchy is an important distinction, much of which explains 
the failure of KW. 
Missing from discussions on politics in Kuwait is a more nuanced understanding of political 
legitimation in protest cycles.10 The literature on Kuwait state-society relations generally focuses on the 
origin and strength of the legislature, politics of the ruling family and merchants, or geopolitical tensions 
to explain historical outcomes (Tavana and York 2020). Much less has been focused on the legitimacy of 
opposition reformers within the system and why they may fail; often citizens’ perceptions in rentier states 
are ignored altogether (Abulof 2017). Schlumberger (2010) argues that there are four long-term sources of 
regime legitimacy in the Arab world: religion; tradition; ideology; and the provision of welfare benefits to 
their populations. In the Gulf, traditional or religious legitimacy has been used to explain why rulers 
command “natural” authority because of links to Islam or family lineage (Ayubi 1996). Ideology often 
takes a back seat to the former two sources, although it is an equally strong source, through which rulers 
have generated normative support for aspirations of creating the “ideal society”. The provision of welfare 
benefits is often considered the most important source of legitimation in rentier states as it renders the 
theory’s political dimensions comprehensible. Yet rentier theorists often imply that there can be value-
free “material” legitimation processes (Holthaus 2019). Many scholars argue that there may be an acute 
mismatch between the regime and publics’ stance on the social contract but these are largely 
unsubstantiated hypotheses offered at the end of publications (Beaugrand 2019). Ubulof (2017) argues 
that we should focus more on the social contracts requiring probes into public political thought. Mitchell 
and Gengler (2019) also note that it is important to understand nonmaterial perceptions – of fairness and 
equality – in determining the economic satisfaction of rentier citizens. 
Using these guidelines, I investigate value-based legitimation practices of the government and 
opposition activists and how they may have impacted the failure of KW. One of the main issues KW 
struggled with was the framing of the collective action, meaning who should be blamed for Kuwait’s 
various issues, how such problems can be solved through civil protest, and convincing the audiences of 
the rationale, necessity and utility of collective action to redress them.11 The major issue was the degree of 
frame resonance with the population, meaning the ability of a collective action frame to resonate or 
appeal to a targeted audience. I focus on two sets of interacting factors account for variation: the 
credibility of the proffered frame based on its consistency, empirical credibility, and credibility of the 
 
9A regime is an ensemble of patterns within the state determining forms and strategies of access to the process of decision-
making, the actors who are admitted, and the rules of the game, includes selection of government, forms of representation, 
and patterns of repression). See Karl, T.L. (1997), The paradox of plenty: Oil booms and petro-states, Berkeley: Univ of 
California Press.  
10 Typically, contemporary scholars equate political legitimacy with “a sense of obligation or willingness to obey 
authorities (value-based legitimacy) that translates into actual compliance with governmental regulations and laws 
(behavioral legitimacy)”. See Levi M., Sacks A., Tyler T. (2009), “Conceptualizing legitimacy, measuring legitimating 
beliefs”, American Behavioral Scientist, 53(3), 354-375, 354. 
11 Framing is the process of selecting certain aspects from the perceived reality and placing them prominently within 
messages, in order to promote a particular definition of the situation, a certain causal interpretation, a certain moral 
evaluation and a proposal for some remedies. See Snow D.A., Benford R.D. (1988), “Ideology, frame resonance, and 
participant mobilization”, International Social Movement Research, 1(1), 197-217.    





frame articulators (Chenoweth et al. 2011). I measured these by real-time participant observation in the 
protests, conducting in-depth interviews with participants, and opinion polling (Reinecke and Ansari 
2020). 
This study focuses on an analysis of informal focus groups with participants in the KW protests from 
2011 to 2014, specifically focusing on tribal and Islamist leaning individuals in diwaniyas. Thirteen pre-
organised diwaniyas was made up of 15 participants, for a total of 195 voting members (Table 1). Each 
focus group was approached based on affiliation and participation in the protests, meaning that the 
respondents were predominantly tribal (specifically from Mutair, Azmi, Ajmi, or Shammari tribes) or 
supportive of Islamist, Salafist, and the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated Islamic Constitutional Movement 
(ICM) movements. Respondents who are tribal and rural are considered “badu” (or bedouin) in Kuwaiti 
nomenclature and are often juxtaposed in identity, class, and socioeconomic status with the settled and 
urban townspeople of Kuwait, often called “hadhari”. These distinctions are key to identity politics in the 
country (Longva 1997). 
 











1 Islamist Sunni Badu 
2 Islamist Sunni Badu 
3 Islamist Sunni Badu 
4 Tribal Sunni Badu 
5 Tribal Sunni Badu 
6 Tribal Sunni Badu 
7 Tribal Sunni Badu 
8 Tribal Sunni Badu 
9 Tribal Sunni Badu 
10 Tribal Sunni Badu 
11 Salafist Sunni Badu 
12 Salafist Sunni Badu 
13 ICM Sunni Hadhari 
 
 
Informal voting, or reaching a consensus, is quite common in diwaniyas. While this doesn’t necessarily 
mean that all members agree with the decision, and many do not, the spirit of consensus can be as 
important as individual decisions as it is often self-enforcing. This type of decision-making straddles the 
public and private divide and can inform decisions about the legitimacy of opposition, regime, and 
government. 
Focusing on the tribal and Islamist demographic is important to study for several reasons. Until the 
1990s, the Al-Sabah relied on tribesmen to bolster their power. But with the integration of the tribe by the 
regime, tribal (shaikhs) authority became more tenuous as demands increased and a young generation of 
tribal leaders, personified in Al-Barrak, took the shaikhs’ place (Azouley 2020). This reality unfolded 
after 2011 when protest movements led by tribal activists forced Nasir to resign. Understanding how a 
previously “loyal” segment of society views the legitimacy of the regime, opposition leadership, and 
protest politics is vital in a society where new forms of cross-cutting oppositional politics are increasing.  




The second reason is due to the use of diwaniyas by tribal individuals. While there is a general 
scholarly consensus on the diwaniya’s value as an alternative political institution “its greater role as a 
socio-cultural anchor – one that reflects immediate social realities – leaves much to be desired in existing 
literature” (Chay 2015). Studying diwaniyas of people from tribal areas moves away from prejudice about 
the badu, reflective of the general “hadhar claim that the badu are alien elements in Kuwaiti society... 
[trying] to lay their hands on welfare goods and services” (Longva 1997). Hadhar depictions of tribes 
often illustrate badu employing nefarious uses for diwaniyas, to consolidate power, transfer ill-gotten 
gains and favours (Redman 2014).  
This study is by no means exhaustive and is purposely narrowed for parsimony. Three major groups 
are left outside of these discussions. The first and most important is women. Although female citizens 
gained the right to vote and to run for office in 2005 they are still largely marginalized from protest 
organising. The second is Shia political groups. While individual Shia participated in KW, organised Shia 
political groups did not (Albloshi and Herb 2018). Hadhari groups, such as National Democratic Circle or 
Taqadomi took part, but were in the minority, both in size and organisational authority. 
 
5. Losing the People: Traditional and Ideological Legitimacy in Perspective 
 
KW’s inability to rally public support behind its goals beyond the threshold of the January protests can 
in part be measured by several normative factors derived from different understandings of legitimacy. The 
first set of factors focus on traditional or ideological legitimacy. It appears that public opinion was largely 
in support of the goals of the initial movement to remove Nasir and dissolve the Parliament. Popular 
support during protests from 2011 to late 2012 reflected a clear picture about the legitimacy of the early 
claims of opposition forces, which included the rhetoric against Nasir, storming Parliament to symbolise 
the people taking back the house, and the election boycott in defiance on the new one-vote law.  
This is reflected in my survey of different tribal diwaniyas. When it came to dissent against the 
government the collective opinions of the various diwaniyas was clear. The vast majority of diwaniyas 
(ten out of thirteen with one abstaining) believed protests again Nasir were legitimate. Nine out of thirteen 
diwaniyas believed that the storming of Parliament was the correct course of action and all thirteen 
supported and took part in the election boycott campaign. 
But when looking at traditional legitimacy of the Emir as the head of the regime and a political figure 
that stands above government politics, we see different results. Those surveyed overwhelmingly agreed 
that much of the loss of support of public opinion related to the movements’ decisions to place blame 
directly on the Emir. This loss of support was reflected in their own collective opinions, with none of the 
diwaniyas supporting the lan nasmah lak speech. Most importantly no diwaniya thought the KW 
organisers had treated the Emir with the traditional respect due to the Sheikh.  
The goal of rescinding the single vote resembled the goals of Nabiha Khamsa in 2005 and Irhal in 
2011, but it was the approach that influenced the surveyed to back away.12 Much of the loss of support 
relates to the Al-Barrak’s lan nasmah lak speech on 15 October 2012, as most people saw him as the 
leader of KW. This was compounded by KW organisers directly addressing the Emir from its Twitter 
account on 30 December 2012, without using the usual polite language: “We as a people address the 
president of the country directly: Our aspirations will not be defeated and that we will continue our 
 
12  For more on Nabiha Khamsa, please see Dazi-Heni, F. (2015), “The Arab Spring Impact on Kuwaiti 
‘Exceptionalism’”, Arabian Humanities, 4, http://journals.openedition.org/cy/2868  





demands for a real democratic, full parliamentary system.” 13 The post did not address him as the Emir, 
but referred to him instead as the president of the country or head of state (ra’is al-dawla), which was 
perceived as a direct insult. This is evident even in the responses to the post. In theoretical terms, the 
attribution of blame and causality to the Emir in the KW frame did not resonate as credible for the 
majority of Kuwaitis I spoke to and surveyed, as they did not think the Emir was a fair target; he is 
considered above politics. This is in contrast to the attacks against Nasir, which all diwaniyas thought was 
considered justifiable. 
There are ideological connotations that also highlight the place of the Emir within Kuwait’s democratic 
institutions and norms of tolerance, no different than most democracies worldwide. The often romantic 
argument about the ruling Sabah and old Kuwait town resonates with the majority of the Kuwaiti 
population, which has a “deep historical memory” of social and political life between 1716 and 1938 
(Azouley 2020). Tribal settlers freely chose the Al-Sabah clan as leader of their fledgling community and 
the ruling family’s legitimacy comes from the way they govern themselves and are open to criticisms and 
complaints. The country’s modern politics are structured around this informal tribal and social solidarity 
(‘asabiyya) with lineage and intermediaries structuring power relations.  
While the divisions and animosities between the hadhari and badu are very real, the result of socio-
economic disparities and state building more than ethnicity or religion, the Al-Sabah have always acted as 
a valued partner and intense social political and economic interaction between the Al-Sabah and the 
desert has fostered continuity rather than dichotomy (Longva 1997; Al-Rasheed 1997; Al Nakib 2014). 
The ruling elite maintain an equilibrium between Kuwait’s Najdi merchants (Al-Sagr, Al-Ghanem), many 
non-lineal friends (Qina’at, Persian Sunni merchants), and tribal groups (Ajam, Awazem, Shammari, and 
Mutran) (Gavrielides 1987). This is why the Al-Sabah never needed to use coercive force.  
These ideals intertwined with statehood after 1961, where the constitutive norm of toleration and close 
personal ties placed public expectations upon the regime to allow for dissent and opposition. Changing 
the Prime Minister, Nasir, in response to popular pressure is representative of such compromise. These 
norms are not mere rhetoric, this is embodied in the Kuwaiti Constitution, which the Sabah regime has 
long accepted as being a constitutional check on absolutism (Yom 2014). When asked what legitimates 
the Emir’s position two diwaniyas said that it was the Sheikh’s consultative role, another two said it was 
to be a responsible leader, and nine said it was due to his role as arbiter of the constitution (Figure 1). 
None mentioned his tribal authority at the head of the Al-Sabah. When asked who rules Kuwait eleven 
diwaniyas said Kuwaiti citizens ruled Kuwait, while one each said that merchants or the Al-Sabah ruling 
family did (Figure 2). When asked further what governs the actions of the Emir, five agreed that it was 
the consent of the people, five said the Constitution, and two said the Parliament (Figure 3). 
Overwhelmingly all thirteen diwaniyas agreed that the Emir served the Kuwaiti people, not the 
Parliament, the ruling family as an institution, merchants, powerful individuals, or tribes. Clearly, more 
than a façade, the constitutional framework institutionalises a “political culture that provided a stable 










13 See post on Karamet Watan Twitter account: https://twitter.com/KarametWatan/status/285313931805868032 














Figure 3: What governs the actions of the Emir? 
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The constitutive norm of toleration also embodies societal expectations about the monarchy’s lenient 
treatment of society. All diwaniyas agreed that the Emir responds to domestic opposition primarily 
through consultation (seven) and legal mechanisms (four). Moreover, the burden of proof falls upon the 
Emir to justify curtailments of rights. In previous eras of political turmoil, such as 1989, the public outcry 
against repression pressured the regime to halt arrests, hold conciliatory dialogues, and after the Gulf 
War, restore the Constitution. Vitally, this understanding has been inscribed in social spaces as well. 
Educational textbooks and the National Museum all underscore the Sabah dynasty’s claimed synonymy 
with tolerance. For instance, the concept of mu‘aradha (opposition) in official narratives is described as a 
productive virtue of Kuwaiti culture and Sabah benevolence (Chay 2016).  
These public expectations, inferred from discussions and participant observation at hundreds of 
diwaniyas from 2012 to 2018, also swing the other way; insulting the Emir publicly is simply not 
acceptable to the majority of the Kuwaiti public.14  This embrace of opposition and public respect are 
pillars of political life and is tied to “Kuwaiti-ness.”15 
KW was a nonviolent movement from the beginning and remained that way.16 Yet the delicate and 
sensitive balance of being tolerant and respectful did not work in the favour of KW organisers. Several 
incidents seriously damaged support for KW. Perhaps the most important incident occurred on 4 
November 2012, the date of the second KW protest. Protesters attempted to march down the Gulf Street 
from the Mishref and Sabah Al-Salem districts, blocking the 5th Ring Road. Police rushed to disperse 
about 2,000 protesters as they blocked one of the busiest throughfares in the country. The 5th Ring Road is 
an important landmark in Kuwait, as it represents the separation of the old urban city, and new districts 
that are primarily occupied by the tribal population since the 1960s. The outer ring roads act as a 
 
14 The Emir’s status as “immune and inviolable” (Article 54 of the Constitution) 
15 Interview at diwaniyya in Fahaheel, February 10, 2020. 
16 See post from Karamet Watan Twitter Account https://twitter.com/KarametWatan/status/279880849216925696;  
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“concrete dividing line between the two social worlds” (Al Nakib 2014). Twelve diwaniyas noted how 
badly the blockade of the road was for the opposition. Not only did it block one of the major throughfares, 
people were injured and it led to an even larger security presence through the country. It fed into the fear 
of instability and the disruption of everyday life in the country. As one former protester noted, “the 
protest leaders didn’t balance very well the need to keep the general population comfortable during the 
reform movement. Even the most ardent supporters did not want to be delayed while shopping. This is 
Kuwait: we are soft.”17 Nine diwaniyas supported this claim and agreed that the ring road blockade made 
them support KW less. 
Interestingly, the police presence did not stop those surveyed from taking part in the protests. All 
thirteen diwaniyas continued to support the movement, regardless of security forces intervention. Only 
four diwaniyas were concerned that protesting would get them in trouble with the authorities. The 
authorities’ reaction to KW in 2012 was harsh in comparison to their response to Irhal in previous years.18 
The government relied on more force to end the rallies, security forces contained dozens of protests and 
arrested hundreds of activists, and brought members of the opposition, especially the youth, to the courts. 
But it was only after the opposition’s poor performance in the February 2013 election and low protest 
numbers that the regime could justify KW as a small faction that was a threat to public order. Many who 
had supported KW found themselves facing costly and exhausting trials, with some winding up serving 
sentences in prison. Some opposition members and their family members lost their jobs or were banned 
from certain government jobs. The government employed its most serious punishment, the revocation of 
citizenship, only after the movement had totally failed to reach its goals, in summer 2014.  
 
5.1 The Mistake of Calling for Regime Change 
 
KW’s main goal; the transition to full parliamentary democracy, went well beyond the demands of 
earlier reform movements. The Majority Bloc demanded parliamentary supremacy in summer 2012, and 
the demand was republished on the KW Twitter account in January 2013. Al-Barrak declared on one 
occasion, “no member of the Sabah family should be the Prime Minister . . . they have destroyed the 
country.”19 The most fervent supporters of KW embraced this goal and the movement was thus caught 
between the maximalist demands of its core supporters and the wider public opinion.Yet the prognosis, or 
solution did not resonate with surveyed supporters. There may be support for a transition to parliamentary 
government, but none of those surveyed thought that there was a viable candidate to replace a ruling 












17 Interview in diwaniya in Qortuba, Kuwait, December 3, 2019. 
18 This is not to imply that there were no consequences whatsoever. In the Irhal campaign, some protesters who stormed 
Parliament were sentenced to prison after an eight-year trial. 
19 “Musallam al-Barrak’s remarks from his diwaniyya”, YouTube, posted by Sarmad Network. 














A key factor affecting frame resonance has to do with the empirical credibility of the collective action 
frame. The important point is not that the claimed connection has to be generally believable, but that it 
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increasingly distanced him and KW from more moderate elements, those that were surveyed, in the social 
movement rank and file.20 Without realistic goals and clear leadership the surveyed diwaniyas said they 
withdrew their support.  
 
5.2 The “Opposition” 
 
Proposing regime change also raises additional issues: while many wanted to trim the powers of the 
ruling family, it was harder to imagine that any leader could knit together the various strands of the 
opposition to form a government and become prime minister. The key factor affecting the credibility of 
the collective action frame refers to the perceived credibility of frame articulators. The movement leaders 
failed to prove that it could govern if it was successful. 
At issue here is a general loss of faith in political leadership in Kuwait among the reformers. Analyses 
of Kuwaiti politics are replete with references to “the opposition” but is there an opposition and what is it 
comprised of? Impressionistic accounts from social scientists and think tanks often refer to the opposition 
as a coherent, publicly known group of elites in the Parliament or prominent activists outside of formal 
politics. However, the reality of Kuwaiti politics, and the opinions of those surveyed, belies these 
distortions as not a single diwaniya thought that there was a real oppositionary movement in Kuwaiti 
politics. In fact, those surveyed rated the leadership skills of the opposition leaders very poorly (Figure 6). 
 
 




The relationship between members of the opposition leaders and ruling family is highly complex. Al-
Barrack’s father, Muhammad Al-Barrack, was a service MP and loyal adherent during Sheikh Jabir Al-
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Sabah’s reign. Merchant political elites, such as Ali Al-Ghanem or Muhammad Al-Saqr or nationalists 
such as Ahmad Khatib or Ahmad Saadoun, have considerable influence on the Emir. Ahmad Saadoun, 
often touted as one of the key figures in the reform camp, has many large government contracts for real 
estate and government contract services. Another way to look at these connections is through 
intermarriage alliances (Al-Shehabi 2015). Al-Barrak is one of the most prominent tribal icons of 
Parliament, continuously re-elected from 1999 to 2012. He made his reputation as an anti-corruption MP, 
by opposing draft laws that he saw as encouraging corruption practices and by confronting fellow 
lawmakers or ministers and officials in parliament session. But Al-Barrak himself is related to the current 
ruling dynasty through his sister, who was married to the former Emir, Jabir Al-Sabah. When it comes to 
opposition strategies most leaders have short-term thinking and depend on contingent circumstances, not 
ideological positions or even familial relations.21  Those surveyed highlighted the complexity of the 
opposition (Figure 7). 
 
 




Most problematically, those surveyed did not think that opposition leaders spoke honestly about their 
intentions and viewed their oppositionary stance against the government as a ploy for personal gain. One 
key example from the protest related to Sheikh Ahmad Fahad Al-Sabah, the former Oil Minister often 
seen as vying for the crown prince office one day. Sheikh Aḥmad’s tacit support for opposition leaders 
and Al-Barrak deeply concerned and put off supporters. On 11 April 11 2014, Al-Barrak and others in the 
Majority Bloc, officially presented their National Reform Project on Al-Waṭan TV, a pro-Ahmad news 
channel, proposing 36 amendments to the Constitution to establish a fully elected government with 
Sheikh Ahmed touted as the royal to implement their vision (Azouley and Beaugrand 2015). Another 
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example was on 21 April 2014, when Al-Barrak launched a virulent attack against Nasir without naming 
him, on the satellite channel al-Yawm. Sheikh Ahmad made similar claims not long after almost word for 
word, deepening suspicion.  
The same suspicions also fell on youth movements. In 2012, CDM tried to create a new political 
dynamic, focusing popular mobilisation outside the traditional opposition process. But many surveyed 
considered the youth movements secretly manipulated by Islamists and tribal sheikhs (Figure 8).   
 
 




Another major loss of support for the movement was the youth leaders themselves as articulators of the 
KW frame. Not a single diwaniya said that the KW youth leaders would be effective members of 
Parliament (Figure 9). The youth leaders often made unrealistic and undeliverable demands for reform, 
according to them. Diwaniya members also said that idealism and limited political experience also 
encouraged uncompromising attitudes and unrealistic expectations. These tendencies have proved to be a 
double-edged sword (Alsayed 2014). CDM had 100 members at its height, and while there was alot of 
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These views on the opposition build on a growing fatigue of Kuwaitis who, faced with hundreds of 
political scandals and stalemates over the decades, tend to be more and more disenchanted with the 
political system and felt that the Kuwaiti democratic experience is a failure at the same time as they are 
proud of their exceptional position in the region as its only democracy. In general, surveyed protesters 
thought the National Assembly was of low quality (Figure 10).  
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While this fatigue translates into a growing disaffection towards the government, it also affects the 
“opposition”, which is often accused of adding tensions that impede the building of consensus and hence 
contribute to the current political stalemate. The Constitution endows the Assembly with considerable 
supervisory power by allowing a majority of elected deputies to interpellate individual ministers or the 
Prime Minister himself. Since 1963, the threat of interpellation has allowed the National Assembly a 
degree of influence over government policy. Yet, the common perception is that the threat or usage of 
interpellation has been abused, initiated more often to settle personal rivalries and draw attention to 
marginal issues instead of passing legislation (Tavana and York 2020).  
At the same time, deputies vote with the regime in the vast majority of cases and laws pass by wide 
margins: since the Parliament’s inception in 1963, 30% of laws were enacted unanimously, and three-
quarters achieved 90% cooperation from elected MPs. Over the history of the entire parliament, only 28 
laws (1%) were passed despite minister opposition (Tavana and York 2020). This deepens suspicions of 
the independence of MPs. 
The structure, or weaknesses of the opposition, thus underlies the episodic political activism of Kuwaiti 
society (Ghabra 2014). When citizens see the opposition fail to solve a particular problem or fulfill its 
obligation to check the government and its performance, social movements emerge (Ghabra 2014). Many 
surveyed noted that underlying all these issues is political culture – both among the government and 
among the governed. Looking at the attitudes of Kuwaiti citizens, Ghanimah Al-Otaibi (2006) has argued 
that “the real problem is not a lack of legal or policy frameworks but rather, one of public apathy”. This 
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5.3 Material Welfare and Legitimacy 
 
When oil wealth began enriching Kuwait in the 1950s, the monarchy pursued popular inclusion: it 
redistributed its hydrocarbon rent to not only benefit the old merchant elite, but also enrich and protect 
other Kuwaitis in the old town and newly enfranchised Bedouin tribes (Crystal 1990). The government 
practice of offering large financial packages to citizens in order to contain domestic discontent became a 
tried and true strategy of the regime. Within a day of the start of the Egyptian protests on 25 January 
2011, Emir Sabah Ahmad Al-Sabah announced a $5 billion KD ($18 billion USD) increase to subsidies 
on fuel and energy along with $1000 KD ($3,600 USD) in cash to every citizen along with free foodstuffs 
from 1 February 2011 and 31 March 2012 (Calderwood 2011).  One can see the correlation between 
consumer spending in Kuwait after 2010 (See Figure 12).  
 
 
Figure 12: Kuwait Consumer Spending 2008-2016 
 
Source: Kuwait Consumer Spending 2008-2016 Data, Central Bank of Kuwait, 
https://tradingeconomics.com/kuwait/consumer-spending 
 
As strikes increased in 2011, so did the increase in payoffs as the government attempted to quell 
dissent. In September 2011, oil-sector workers were given pay rises ranging from 35% to 65%, depending 
on their position. In March 2012, Kuwait’s Civil Service Commission announced that there would be a 
25% increase in the basic rate of public-sector pay (Kinninmont 2012). In addition, the government 
launched a more targeted series of initiatives to reconnect with the generation of emboldened youth. A 
small enterprises fund for Kuwaitis under 35 years of age was created and a newly minted Ministry of 
Youth was founded. The government also rapidly expanded its social media footprint, attempting to 
legitimate improved services and governance (Martin 2019). 
But Kuwait’s wealth alone was not enough to forestall demands for more political rights; the expanded 
social spending program since 2011 did not quiet popular protests. Twelve diwaniyas, only one 
dissenting, stated that new subsidies given to Kuwaiti citizens in 2011, before KW began, did not impact 
their decision to protest. Furthermore, the introduction of new subsidies after 2012 did not stop them from 
protesting after KW from is full swing. These payments are just a small snapshot of increases to rent 
distribution, which is part of a historical trend (Figure 13). Total government subsidies jumped from $817 




million KD in 2005 to $3.372 billion KD in 2010. Wages and salaries jumped from $2.125 billion KD in 
2005 to $4.047 billion KD in 2010. Repeated cancellation of Kuwaiti nationals’ debts, in 1979, 1982, 
1990-1991, and in 2013, sometimes without crises, is continued sign of government responsiveness to 
citizens’ material needs and wants.  
 
Figure 13: Kuwait Consumer Spending 1960-2017 
 
Source: Kuwait Consumer Spending 2008-2016 Data, Central Bank of Kuwait, 
https://tradingeconomics.com/kuwait/consumer-spending 
 
Citizens in general, accept subsidy and salary increases as a normal part of life. In interviews, it 
became clear it was a requirement of the government, not simply a gift or trend. “It’s not some 
momentary political blip,” said one interviewee, “Simply put the government is flush with oil money and 
now spends more than in the past. It’s their job!” 22 The current welfare state is something that most 
Kuwaitis rely on, and opposition figures are not seen as credible auditors or managers of the generous 
benefit packages (Figure 14). Only the current government, according to the majority surveyed, are seen 
















22 Interview in a diwaniya in Jahra, March 1, 2020. 














Overall, the opinions provided in the diwaniyas see a dual, and somewhat contradictory series of 
opinions on the opposition. While many diwaniyas have clear interests in reform and changing the 
system, an obvious reason to go out on the streets, the capacity and viability of the current opposition 
movement was found wanting. In some ways this mirrors events in Bahrain, where the more moderate 
members of the protest movement, especially the rank and file, shied away from unrealistic goals and 
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This article investigated the failure of the KW movement to maintain public support for its aims. The 
reasons for the loss of support were varied, but illustrated the importance of normative conceptions of 
legitimacy. Like Bahrain, the initial objective of the movement was legislative reform yet fragmented 
when demands for regime change were voiced. Traditional and ideological forms of legitimacy negatively 
impacted the support for the KW as insulting the Emir directly lessened support for the reform movement. 
The KW’s inability to articulate a frame that was supported by the larger public was the main reason 
for the downfall of the movement. Disruptions of transportation and perceptions that the protesters were 
violent also lessened support for KW. Much of this related to poor frame planning, and a lack of 
coordination among leaders. Furthermore, the lack of credible articulators, especially opposition figures 
like Musallam Al-Barrak, highlighted a major sense of apathy in the Kuwaiti public towards opposition 
politics in Kuwait, which are often viewed as just as corrupt as those they pledge to reform.  
Finally, material legitimacy actually played a very little part in the protests themselves, as Kuwaitis 
have come to expect these rewards and trust the authorities in providing these benefits. This article fills a 
gap in the literature by looking at the legitimacy of the KW protest movement, and helps to understand 
why movements, even with groundswells of popular support, can decline quickly without repression or 
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